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THE JURY: TRIAL AND ERROR IN THE AMERICAN COURTROOM.
By Stephen J. Adler. New York, N.Y.: Times Books. 1994.
Pp. 285. Hardcover. $25.00.
Reviewed by Rogelio A. Lasso
I. INTRODUCTION
The current debate about the role of the jury in the
American judicial process would benefit from a balanced ex-
amination of the jury system. As lawmakers throughout the
country use anecdotes and exaggerations to implement laws
that diminish the role of the jury in criminal, tort, and securi-
ties cases, a careful analysis of the jury process is critical. A
methodical study of issues like the exclusion of educated citi-
zens from jury duty, jury nullification, peremptory chal-
lenges, and the ability of jurors to manage complex cases is
particularly important. Steven Adler, a Harvard-trained
lawyer and legal editor of The Wall Street Journal, appar-
ently seeks to accomplish this examination in The Jury: Trial
and Error in the American Courtroom [hereinafter The Jury].
This book, however, adds little more than "pulp nonfiction" to
the current polemic.
From his study of six trials, the author of The Jury con-
cludes that juries decide most cases incorrectly. Adler la-
ments that he "repeatedly encountered scenes that bore next
to no resemblance to the high-minded debates of 12 Angry
Men" (the 1957 movie classic about a jury's deliberation pro-
cess directed by Sidney Lumet and starring Henry Fonda).'
Adler's book questions the value of a jury system that fre-
** Associate Professor of Law, Washburn University School of Law. B.S.
1973, Mankato State University; J.D. 1985, University of Minnesota. Professor
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1. STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JURY: TRIAL AND ERROR IN THE AMERICAN
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quently results in "shoddy - and sometimes patently stupid
- verdicts."2
The Jury provides interesting reading on a timely and
controversial topic. Adler is a skilled journalist and an en-
gaging writer. Ultimately, however, the book's weaknesses
diminish its contribution to the current debate on the jury
system. The main weakness is that Adler's anecdotal exami-
nation of only six trials cannot support his broad assessments
about the jury system. Additionally, his opinion that juries
perform badly whenever he disagrees with the result is arro-
gant and offensive. Finally, Adler's unrelenting attack on ju-
ries belies his latter platitudes in favor of the jury system.
Although not all juries make the best decisions all the time,
the system works remarkably well most of the time. More-
over, the jury trial is too valuable to warrant Adler's attack.
II. HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE MODERN JURY
A brief historical perspective on our jury system is help-
ful to better appreciate its value. Although the origins of the
jury trial is the subject of debate,3 there is agreement that
our modem jury system can be traced to twelfth century Eng-
land.4 Prior to that time, Norman kings, like William the
Conqueror, utilized the jury not to safeguard justice but to
enforce sovereign power.5 During the twelfth century, King
Henry II (and later Henry III) transformed the jury from a
2. Id. at xv.
3. Some scholars believe the jury trial was conceived by the ancient
Greeks and brought to England by the Romans. See, e.g., MAXlMUS A. LESSER,
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE JURY SYSTEM 171 (1894); PATRICK DEV-
LIN, TRIAL BY JURY: THE HAMLYN LECTURES 5-6 (1956). Others claim juries
were used by the Saxons long before the Norman Conquest. E.g., MATHEW
HALE, THE HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 264 (1987).
4. See, e.g., DEVLIN, supra note 3, at 6-7; JAMES THAYER, A PRELIMINARY
TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 47, 54-67 (1898). Although in a
different form and for a different purpose than today's system, the device of the
jury was brought to England by the Normans in the eleventh century. Id.
5. Thayer, supra note 4, at 54-67. Under the Norman kings, a juror was a
citizen compelled by the King to take a juramentum (an oath). DEVLIN, supra
note 3, at 5. The Latin termjuramentum reflects Norman law's roots in Roman
law. The word "jury" derives from this Norman law procedure.
The juramentum was so strong a guarantor of truth that the King's officers
would convene, by compulsion, a jury to establish the facts in administrative
inquests. Id. at 6. William the Conqueror, for example, used a jury to compile




tool of sovereign power to an instrument of justice. For in-
stance, if two of King Henry's subjects were involved in a land
dispute, the Crown's officers would chose jurors from the dis-
putants' neighborhood. The party able to convince twelve ju-
rors to swear that he was entitled to the land received title to
the disputed real estate.6 This was the origin of the trial by
twelve jurors. Because the typical juror lived in the village
where the trial was held, he usually knew the facts of the
dispute. Under Henry II, the jury replaced the more primi-
tive methods of dispute resolution such as trial by battle and
trial by ordeal.7 Under Henry II, the right to a jury trial was
codified as a constitutional right in the Magna Carta.'
Between the twelfth and the seventeenth centuries, the
right to jury trial was expanded to all criminal and most civil
cases.9 The right to a jury trial traveled the Atlantic with the
English colonization of North America where it was ratified
by each of the colonies' charters. 10 In 1774, the first Conti-
nental Congress reasserted that the colonists had the right to
be "tried by their peers.""' On July 4, 1776, the Declaration
of Independence proclaimed that all American citizens had
the right to a jury trial.' 2 In 1791, the states ratified the Bill
of Rights guaranteeing, through the Sixth and Seventh
Amendments, the right to a jury trial in criminal and civil
cases.13
6. DEVLIN, supra note 3, at 7-8.
7. Id. at 6-7. Trial by battle was a means of settling disputes by having
the litigants (or their hired fighters) engage in physical combat until one or the
other surrendered or was defeated. STEPHAN LANDSMAN, The History of the Ad-
versary System, in THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE 7-8
(1984). In some types of criminal cases, trial by battle continued to the death.
Id. Trial by ordeal required the litigants to submit to what can only be de-
scribed as a very strict test, like being burned at the stake or submerged in cold
or hot water. If the litigant survived, he "won" the case. Id.
8. J. KENDALL FEW, TRIAL BY JURY 18 (1993).
9. Id. at 16-28; see also PAULA DIPERNA, JURIES ON TRIAL 28 (1984).
10. In 1606, for example, the First Charter of Virginia guaranteed to the
residents of that colony the protections codified in the Magna Carta, including
the right to trial by jury. FEw, supra note 8, at 28-29. In 1632, the Charter of
Massachusetts Bay did the same for the inhabitants of that colony. Id.
11. Id. at 33; DiPERNA, supra note 9, at 28.
12. DiPERNA, supra note 9, at 28.
13. FEW, supra note 8, at 34.
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III. THE ROLE OF THE JURY IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
A. The Value of the Jury
I consider [trial by jury] as the only anchor ever yet
imagined by man, by which a government can be held to
the principles of its constitution.
14
The jury trial is essential to the full democratic aspira-
tion of government by the people. 5 As Aristotle observed
more than 2000 years ago, "If liberty and equality . . .are
chiefly to be found in democracy, they will be best attained
when all persons alike share in the government to the ut-
most.' 6 Jury duty provides one of the few avenues available
for all citizens to participate directly in the affairs of govern-
ment. That the United States Constitution and the constitu-
tions of every state guarantee the right to a jury trial under-
scores its importance as an American democratic
institution. 17
Throughout history, our Anglo-Saxon ancestors have
used juries to protect citizens against unfettered governmen-
tal power.' 8 Today, juries safeguard common citizens against
14. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine (July 11, 1789), in 3 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 71 (H.A. Washington ed., 1859). While in
Paris, Jefferson wrote to Thomas Paine recounting his observations of the first
post-French Revolution national assembly. Jefferson reiterated the value of the
jury and lamented that although he considered jury trials indispensable, "a ma-
jority [of the French national assembly] cannot be induced to adopt the trial by
jury." Id.
15. FEW, supra note 8, at 265 ("One principal function of government is the
administration of justice and trial by jury is justice 'by the people' in its truest
sense."); see also DIPERNA, supra note 9, at 1 ("The concept of the jury system is
as close as any society has ever come to true democracy.").
16. Aristotle, Politics (c. 322 B.C.), in THE QUOTABLE LAWYER 84 (David
Shrager & Elizabeth Frost eds., 1986).
17. Article III and the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution
guarantee the right to a jury in criminal cases. The Seventh Amendment pre-
serves the right to a jury trial in civil cases brought in federal courts. Almost
every state provides for jury trials in both criminal and civil cases. See, e.g.,
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 13; KAN. CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS,
§5.
18. Until the early eighteenth century, jurors could openly disagree with
the law and decide the case based on what they thought should be the right
outcome. DIPERNA, supra note 9, at 28-29. This power to disagree with the law
was known as jury nullification. Id. One of the most celebrated examples of
American jury nullification was the 1735 trial of John Peter Zenger. Zenger,
the publisher of the New York Weekly Journal, was charged with libeling the
governor of New York. Although the article for which Zenger was prosecuted
was clearly unlawful under the existing law, the jury acquitted Zenger. The
Pennsylvania Gazette praised the verdict by declaring that "if it is not law it is
658 [Vol. 36
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arbitrary and overreaching government actions, 19 and con-
sumers from unsafe products and hidden dangers.
20
B. Attacks on the Jury System Are Not New
The right to trial by jury has consistently been attacked
by those who wished to exert unchallenged power. In France,
the Nazis abolished the right to a jury trial at the beginning
of World War II and it has never been restored.21 In Ger-
many, the right to a jury trial survived for only fifty years.
Introduced by Napoleon to the conquered provinces of the
Confederation of the Rhine, it was adopted by a unified Ger-
many in 1870 but eliminated by the Weimar Republic in
1924.22 In other European nations, the decline of the right to
a jury trial followed closely the weakening of their democra-
21
cies. In England, despite the Magna Carta's guarantee of
trial by jury and its adoption in the new world, Parliament all
but eliminated the right to a jury trial during the last half of
the nineteenth century.24
C. The Current Attacks on the Jury
Today, the anti-democratic forces that eroded the jury
system in England are seeking to accomplish the same in the
United States. During the past two decades, America's privi-
leged class has sought to diminish the participation of juries
in civil and criminal trials.2 5 Like its English predecessor,
better than law, it ought to be law, and will always be law wherever justice
prevails." See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY 73-75 (1994). There is still
debate among lawyers and commentators whether the jury has a right to diso-
bey the law. Id. at 61-68.
19. See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970); Duncan v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
20. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Regulatory Function of the Civil Jury, in
VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 61-92 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
21. FEW, supra note 8, at 442.
22. Id. at 444-46.
23. Id. at 448.
24. Id. at 437-40.
25. From the start of the "civil justice" or "tort reform" movement 16 years
ago, a coalition of industrialists, insurers, and medical groups have sought to
remove civil juries from as much of the decision-making process as possible.
See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM IN AMERICA (Aug. 1991). Mandatory limits on compensatory and puni-
tive damages and the elimination of joint and several liability have been man-
dated by several state legislatures and are currently being considered in Con-
gress. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3407 (1994) (limiting total recovery and
recovery for noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases); KAN. STAT.
1996] 659
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the American economic aristocracy understands that juries
provide one of the last domains where ordinary citizens can
hold the overclass accountable. It is no surprise, then, that
this oligarchy has endeavored to accomplish in the United
States what the English aristocracy has already achieved: all
but the complete elimination of the jury trial in civil and
criminal cases.2" Using its unique access to the media,
America's privileged class is seeking to convince us that the
jury system is to blame for a multitude of evils. Juries are
accused of increasing the cost of medical care and weakening
America's edge in global market competition. Juries are
also blamed for inciting the Los Angeles riots in the after-
math of the first Rodney King beating trial,28 and for per-
verting justice and racially dividing the nation by improperly
acquitting O.J. Simpson.2 9
ANN. § 60-3402 (limiting recovery and heightening the burden of proof for puni-
tive damages); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (eliminating joint and several liabil-
ity); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73 (West 1992) (limiting punitive damages
in most tort cases); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:4-d (1994) (limiting damages in
personal injury cases); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-7.1 (1992) (limiting damages in
malpractice cases).
"Tort Reform" is a cornerstone of the Republican "Contract with America."
See H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Euphemistically called the "Com-
mon Sense Legal Reforms Act of 1995," H.R. 10 proposes, among other changes,
tougher standards of proof and mandatory caps for punitive damages as well as
tougher standards for compensatory damages in product liability and medical
malpractice cases. Id.
26. Since 1883, the British Parliament has slowly eliminated the right to a
jury trial in all but a few civil actions. Buckley, Civil Trial by Jury, in CURRENT
LEGAL PROBLEMS 63 (1966). Currently, jury trials in England are limited to
actions for slander, libel, false imprisonment, seduction, breach of promise of
marriage, and malicious prosecution. Id. In addition, many criminal offenses
previously triable to a jury are now summarily tried to a magistrate. James
Driscoll, The Decline of the English Jury, 17 Am. Bus. LAw J. 99, 104 (1979).
27. See, e.g., Tort Reform: Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Comm.,
104th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in FED. Doc. CLEARING HOUSE CONG. TEST.,
Apr. 4, 1995 (Victor Schwartz, an attorney representing insurance companies
and arguing for caps in medical malpractice claims, testified that limiting "er-
ratic" jury verdicts will reduce health care costs); Dan Quayle, Civil Justice
Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 559 (1992); Alfred W. Cortese, Jr. & Kathleen L.
Blaner, Civil Justice Reform in America: A Question of Parity with Our Inter-
national Rivals, 13 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. 1, 7 (1992).
28. In The Jury, Adler suggests that the post-trial disturbances in south-
central Los Angeles were the result of the jury's decision in the first trial of the
officers who beat Rodney King. ADLER, supra note 1, at 240.
29. In the aftermath of the acquittal of O.J. Simpson, some commentators
have suggested that the verdict was due not to reasonable doubt, but rather to
the refusal of black jurors to convict an obviously guilty black defendant. See,
e.g., Kingsley Guy, Trial Demonstrated Perversion of Long-Revered System, FT.
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D. The Need to Improve the Jury System
As the gap between rich and poor rapidly widens, ° input
into the justice system from all citizens is critical to the sur-
vival of our democracy. By providing individuals an avenue
to affect a collective result, jury duty provides one of the few
means by which a small group of citizens can directly partici-
pate in the affairs of government. The jury system, however,
is not without its flaws. A book that explores ways to improve
the jury system would be a welcome endeavor.3 1 Unfortu-
nately, Adler's The Jury, is not such a book.
IV. ANALYSIS OF ADLER'S THE JURY
As Adler sees it, our jury system is not only flawed, it is a
contradiction. "We celebrate the jurors' democratic power but
no longer trust the decisions they reach," he tells us in his
introduction to The Jury. To explain this contradiction, Adler
reenacts six jury trials. Adler reconstructs these trials by
post-trial interviews with jurors, judges and lawyers involved
in each case. These trials demonstrate, in Adler's view, that
LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Oct. 5, 1995, at A26 (verdict was a "travesty ofjus-
tice"); John Kolbe, O.J. Verdict Says Race Drives Logic, PHOENIX GAZETTE, Oct.
4, 1995, at B7 (the jury's verdict was a result of "a blatant appeal to prejudice").
Several pundits warn us that this "jury nullification" verdict will lead to a white
backlash. Kenneth B. Noble, In the City of the Beautiful People, Trial Hinged
on Uglier Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1995, at A13 (quoting law professor Susan
Estrich as stating that the verdict will cause a white backlash); Frank Rich, Los
Angeles: The Big Nowhere, KAN. CITY STAR, Oct. 9, 1995, at B5 ("When O.J.
gets off, the whites will ... punish blacks by closing their day-care programs
and cutting off their Medicaid.").
30. The United States has the highest level of concentration of wealth in
the industrialized world. The richest 1% of the population owns almost 40% of
the nation's wealth, compared to 18% for the wealthiest Britons. See, e.g., Keith
Bradsher, Gap in Wealth in U.S. Called Widest in West, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17,
1995, at Al; Michael Lind, To Have and Have Not: Notes on the Progress of the
American Class War, HARPER'S, June 1995, at 35.
31. The importance of the jury trial has led to extensive scrutiny of the jury.
Legal scholars, social scientists, psychologists, and journalists have long stud-
ied, critiqued and sought to explain and improve the jury deliberation process.
See, e.g., PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY: THE HAMLYN LECTURES (1956) (the
author was a British jurist when he gave these lectures); HARRY KALVEN, JR. &
HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966) (the authors are legal and sociological
scholars); REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY (1983) (the authors are social
scientists); PAULA DIPERNA, JURIES ON TRIAL: FACES OF AMERICAN JUSTICE
(1984) (Ms. DiPerna is a journalist); SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTS-
MAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (1988) (the
editors of this collection are psychologists, the authors include social scientists,
lawyers and legal scholars).
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the jury system is badly malfunctioning, primarily due to the
stupidity of jurors. He concludes, nevertheless, that the jury
system can survive if we follow his prescription for reforms.
The book is divided into three major sections: "The Vi-
sion," "The Disappointment," and "The Hope." In "The Vi-
sion," Adler describes the idealized American vision of the
jury as a group of "little guys" who, "told what the written law
is, can nonetheless disregard it when circumstances
require."3 2
In the first chapter, Adler examines a death penalty case
which he believes is typical and embodies everything that is
good about the jury. A case where the killer confesses to the
crime, mounts no defense, and the jury convicts him after de-
liberating for only a few hours is hardly a typical death pen-
alty case.33 The only reason Adler finds this case acceptable
is because he agrees with the verdict.
"The Disappointment" begins with Adler's largely unsup-
ported assessment that the jury system is in major disre-
pair.3 4 Adler relies on the $10.5 billion jury verdict in the
32. ADLER, supra note 1, at 3. Adler seems to say that Americans value jury
nullification. He apparently did not anticipate the fury that white Americans
expressed when they believed that the O.J. Simpson verdict was the result of
"little guys" who "disregarded" the written law because the "circumstances [i.e.
Mark Fuhrman] require[d]" it. Id.
33. There is very little that is typical about this death penalty case. The
defendant is a white man accused of the unemotional killing of two other
whites, apparently to rob them. First, studies show that black defendant/white
victim cases most likely result in a death penalty conviction. See, e.g., DAVID C.
BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRI-
CAL ANALYSIS 42-46, 140-97 (1990); William Bowers & Glen L. Pierce, Arbitrari-
ness and Discrimination Under Post-Fuhrman Capital Statutes, 26 CRIME &
DELINQ. 563, 578 (1980). Second, the rate of murder is much greater among
nonwhites than among whites. For example, the homicide rate for white males
is 8.2 per 100,000 while the rate for black males is 61.1 per 100,000. BALDUS ET
AL., supra, at 42-46, 140-97. A more typical death penalty case would have
involved a black defendant and a white victim.
34. Adler maintains that "academic studies, lawyers' and judges' anecdotes,
and court records of damage awards reduced on appeal as a result of jurors'
errors" support his conclusion that juries generally perform poorly. ADLER,
supra note 1, at xvi. To sustain his argument, however, Adler asserts only thatjury awards are altered by judges in about 20% of civil cases, and that his edu-
cated guess is that "punitive damages may be reduced or eliminated on appeal
more often than not." Id. For further support, Adler recommends we read Rob-
ert MacCoun, Inside the Black Box: What Empirical Research Tells Us About
Decisionmaking by Civil Juries, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIL JURY SYSTEM
137 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993). Actually, MacCoun's article demonstrates the
risk in using a few jury verdicts "to infer general principles of jury perform-
ance." Id. at 139. See also infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
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Pennzoil-Texaco case 35 and the verdict in the Rodney King
trial to argue that juries regularly blunder. To bolster his
conclusion, Adler analyzes five cases in which he believes ju-
ries reached erroneous verdicts.
A. The Flawed Jury Selection Process
Adler first presents the criminal trial of Imelda Marcos
to prove that the American jury system is not working. The
case does reveal a jury selection process that permits capable
citizens to easily avoid jury duty. 6 It further demonstrates
the effect incompetent lawyering may have on a verdict.
37
The Marcos case may even demonstrate the effect of jury nul-
lification in action as Adler's account insinuates that some ju-
rors decided to acquit Mrs. Marcos because they believed that
the case should have been prosecuted by the Philippine Gov-
ernment in the Philippines and not by the U.S. Government
here.3 8 Adler's amusing behind-the-scenes reenactment of
the jury's deliberations in the Marcos case manages only to
illustrate the effect factors outside the jury room can have on
a verdict. In doing so, Adler fails to persuade the reader that
jury ineptitude or stupidity led to Mrs. Marcos' acquittal. Ad-
ler offers no evidence that another jury hearing the same case
would have reached a different verdict. Simply believing in
Mrs. Marcos' guilt, as Adler emphatically does, in no way
means that the jury reached an incorrect verdict. As with all
the cases he analyzes in the book, Adler's evaluation of the
jury's competence seems based entirely on whether the jury
reaches a verdict with which he agrees.
35. In 1985, after a four month trial, a Houston jury held that Texaco had to
pay $10.53 billion in damages to Pennzoil. The jury found that Texaco inter-
fered with Pennzoil's bid to acquire Getty Oil in a 1984 hostile takeover. Steven
Greenhouse, Business and the Law; Pennzoil's Huge Award, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
26, 1985, at D2. In 1987, the Texas Court of Appeals upheld the verdict. Tex-
aco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
36. ADLER, supra note 1, at 53-63.
37. Adler's reconstruction of the Marcos' trial reveals how the prosecutors
presented the complex financial transactions that benefited Mrs. Marcos in a
manner that jurors found incomprehensible. See, e.g., ADLER, supra note 1, at
69-70. By contrast, Adler's account demonstrates how Mrs. Marcos' lawyer,
Gerry Spence, was able to present his client as a "decent, generous, and perse-
cuted woman," who the jury liked. Id. at 70-71.
38. ABRAMSOM, supra note 18, at 79. Jury nullification is the term given to
a verdict decided in violation of the law. Id. at 61; see also supra note 18 and
accompanying text.
19961 663
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
B. The Jury Riggers
Adler next tackles the controversial issue of jury consul-
tants. Adler believes that jury consultants can "rig" a jury to
reach an incorrect result. Adler analyzes a case in which a
child severely injured by a drunk driver sues the corporate
owner of the restaurant that served the driver alcohol imme-
diately preceding the accident. As part of their litigation
strategy, the plaintiff's lawyers arranged to present an
abridged trial before a group of mock "jurors" hired by the
jury consultants. Although the plaintiff's lawyers hired the
jury consultants, the mock jury did not know which party had
hired them. Although the driver had told the police at the
scene that she had been drinking for several hours at the res-
taurant, the mock jury believed she may have been having an
affair after she left the restaurant. The mock verdict was
that the driver and the plaintiff shared fault for the accident.
The mock jury exonerated the restaurant partly because they
considered the driver's story less than credible.
Adler suggests that at this point the plaintiff's lawyers
should have dismissed the suit or accept a modest settlement.
Instead, the plaintiff's lawyers decided their focus should be
more clearly on the huge restaurant chain's negligent train-
ing of its staff members in detecting drunk patrons. The law-
yers used the consultant to help them select jurors whose
characteristics and attitudes would supposedly make them
sympathetic to the plaintiff's case. Adler does not tell us
whether the restaurant chain's lawyer used jury consultants
to select pro-defense jurors. The parties' lawyers selected a
jury that was far from what the plaintiff's lawyers had
sought. This jury, however, never heard the case because the
judge declared a mistrial as a result of improper conduct on
the part of plaintiff's lawyers. Before the next jury heard the
case, the parties settled the case for a relatively modest sum
in light of the plaintiff's severe and irreversible brain injury.
Adler's use of this case is less than compelling because
we never find out whether jury consultants "rigged" the jury
so that the "undeserving child" recovered damages. The set-
tlement indicates that despite the "rigged" jury, both parties
were uncertain as to the eventual verdict. This weakens Ad-
ler's suggestion that jury consultants unfairly advantage a




Adler concludes that "objectively" the child did not de-
serve to win. As with the previous case, Adler's "objective"
conclusion is based on little more than his subjective belief
that the plaintiff "didn't deserve to win damages from [the
restaurant]." Adler derides the plaintiff's lawyers' single-
minded determination to achieve the best results for their cli-
ent. Adler would have advised his client to drop the suit or
accept a nuisance settlement. Adler also urges that a jury of
individuals "selected for their likely partisanship" lacks the
"moral authority" to decide cases fairly. 9
Adler's conclusions that a lawyer should view the case
"objectively" and that jury consultants produce a jury system
unworthy of our faith demonstrates his simplistic view of our
adversary system. The adversary system is the primary
model of dispute resolution in the Anglo-American legal sys-
tem.40 The adversary system compels clearly different roles
from the lawyers and the decision-maker. The adversary
model requires that opposing lawyers zealously advocate the
interests of disputing parties while the jury (or judge) act as
the neutral arbitrator.41 The adversary system mandates
that lawyers refrain from pursuing frivolous claims. That
does not imply, however, that a lawyer drop a lawsuit at the
first sign of a weakness in their case. As advocates, the role
of opposing attorneys is to employ their innate talents and
acquired lawyering skills in a two-step process. In the first
step, each advocate defines the issues of a dispute and seeks
legal and factual support for the client's position.42 In this
step, the adversary process demands that lawyers promote
their clients' position by advancing evidence favorable to
their clients and refuting unfavorable evidence.
In the case Adler examines, the plaintiff's lawyers did
just that. By focusing on the strengths of the case and seek-
ing to diminish the weaknesses, the lawyers for the plaintiff
39. ADLER, supra note 1, at 113.
40. The adversary model of the Anglo-American judicial system contrasts
with what is commonly called the inquisitorial or interrogative model used in
civil law countries. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Adversary System, in
ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 120, 120-35 (1978).
41. See, e.g., Hazard, supra note 40, at 120; see also Lon Fuller, The Adver-
sary System, in TALKS ON AsmuicAN LAW 30, 30-32 (1961). This contrasts with
the inquisitorial model where it is the judge who is called upon to both make a
decision as well as protect the interests of opposing parties. Id.
42. Hazard, supra note 40, at 121.
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pursued their proper roles within the adversary system.
Anything less would have betrayed their duty as advocates.
Once all relevant information is made available to the
decision-maker, the second step of the adversary process pro-
ceeds with the advocates making competitive presentations
to the decision-maker. In this step, the advocates use the
facts and law to present the claims in the light most favorable
to their respective clients.43
Even if consultants could affect jury selection, both par-
ties (theoretically) have access to them. Any perceived ad-
vantage a plaintiff may secure by selecting a pro-plaintiff ju-
ror will likely be offset by a juror chosen by the defense. This
is indeed the essence of the adversary system.
Adler's conclusions about jury consultants are based
more on common mythology than on empirical research. Ad-
ler compares jury consultants to mercenaries who can pick a
jury whose decision will not be based on the merits of a
case. 44 This fiction may have created a cottage industry of
jury consultants but has been debunked by empirical re-
search. Studies show that jury decisions in most cases are
driven more by the evidence than by the individual character-
istics and attitudes of the jurors.
C. Simple Jurors Can't Handle Complex Cases
In chapter four, Adler seeks to prove that common folks
are too dense to decide complex cases.46 His vehicle is an an-
43. Id.
44. Adler asserts that "jury consultants help select juries that will serve the
interests of whichever party pays for the consultants' services." ADLER, supra
note 1, at 44.
45. See, e.g., Michael J. Saks, Social Scientists Can't Rig Juries, in THE
AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 48 (Saul M. Kassin &
Lawrence S. Wrightsman eds., 1988).
46. Adler is not alone in concluding that ordinary citizens are not intellectu-
ally equipped to decide complex cases. Judges, scholars and lawyers have for
years complained that lay juries cannot comprehend complex cases. Adler
quotes former Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren Burger who lamented that
"even Jefferson would be appalled at the prospect of a dozen of his stout yeomen
and artisans trying to cope with some of today's complex litigation." ADLER,
supra note 1, at 119. Lawyers representing business interests often complain
that lay jurors decide cases incorrectly because they do not understand the com-
plexities of modern civil litigation. See, e.g., Richard B. Schmitt, Juries in Pat-
ent Cases Reconsidered, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 1994, at B6 (after a jury ruled
that AT&T had infringed on a small company's patent, lawyers for AT&T com-
plained that the jury consisted of "unemployed laborers and housewives [who]
did not understand that stuff."). Like Adler, however, these critics prove only
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titrust case between two tobacco companies involving preda-
tory pricing in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act.4 7 The
trial lasted seven months, the longest in North Carolina his-
tory. The lawyers were convinced they were communicating
with the jury but in reality the jurors found the technical and
legal jargon incomprehensible. The judge contributed to the
confusion by reading eighty-one pages of impenetrable in-
structions. Adler portrays a jury that remained baffled
throughout the trial by the hyper-technical evidence
presented by both sides. Unable to comprehend fully the is-
sues presented, but determined to fulfill their sworn duty, ju-
rors alternated between anger and despair. After deliberat-
ing for eleven days, the jury held in favor of the plaintiff and
the defendant appealed. The United States Supreme Court
reversed, concluding that the jury's verdict was
unreasonable.
If the jury's verdict was incorrect, was it due to the ju-
rors' failure to grasp the complexities of antitrust law or to
something more fundamental? A failure to communicate per-
haps? Adler suggests the uneducated and simple jurors were
too dense to understand complex issues. Underlying Adler's
suggestion, however, there is a more plausible explanation
for the jury's decision. The jury's inability to comprehend
this complex case was more likely due to the incompetence of
the lawyers and the incomprehensibility of the judge's in-
structions. It was incumbent upon the high-paid lawyers to
communicate their theories to the lay jurors without losing
them in a fog of legal patois. The jurors should not be blamed
for the lawyers' and the judge's failure to communicate. Even
Adler admits that the lawyers' presentation in this case was
so inept that "[a] jury didn't have to be uneducated or ill in-
formed to get lost in [the lawyer's explanation of the applica-
ble law]." Adler also chides the judge, who could have made
the case more understandable to the jury had he managed it
more intelligently. Adler's rendering of this antitrust case
demonstrates only that there are incompetent lawyers and
judges and that some courtroom practices are counterproduc-
tive. His conclusion that lay jurors are too stupid to handle
that their Ivy League education helped mold an elitist attitude toward ordinary
citizens and a conviction that anyone whose views differ from theirs is simply
wrong.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1988).
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complex cases is not only elitist; it is not supported by this
case.
D. The Average Citizen Versus Corporate America
In chapter five, Adler evaluates a product liability suit
brought by a fifty-five-year-old mother of four infected with
the AIDS virus during a transfusion in 1983. The defendant,
a for-profit blood bank, supplied the blood at a time prior to
widespread monitoring for AIDS. The plaintiff's witnesses
included physicians from the Centers for Disease Control
(CDC). The CDC scientists testified that in 1983 blood bank
officials had refused to follow the CDC's recommendations
that the blood supply be more aggressively protected from the
emerging threat of AIDS. The defendant's executives and
other blood bank industry officials testified that in 1983 de-
fendant had complied with most of the available industry
safety standards. One of the defendant's high-ranking offi-
cials testified that, like the rest of the blood bank industry,
the defendant's policies had been designed to "encourage ap-
plicants to exclude themselves if they fit into any of the high
risk categories while not offending, embarrassing, or exclud-
ing anyone who might be a healthy and valuable donor."48
The jury had no trouble finding liability in light of the blood
banking industry's indifferent policies despite the deadly con-
sequences of AIDS. Calculating the damages, however,
stumped the jury. In the absence of guidance from the law-
yers and the judge, the jury awarded the dying woman and
her husband a total of $8.15 million in damages. Adler flunks
the jury for finding liability, for awarding "exorbitant" dam-
ages, and for having an anti-corporate bias.
This case belies these conclusions. First, Adler's conclu-
sion that the jury should not have found the blood bank liable
is based only on his disagreement with the result. While he
concedes that the blood bank's negligence was a close call,
Adler baldly asserts that the jury's ruling was "clearly" wrong
because it found that the "common practice" of the defend-
ant's industry was unreasonable. 49 Adler's arrogance is off
base again. The jury heard the best arguments from both
48. ADLER, supra note 1, at 155. The defendant, like all for-profit blood
banks, made its money by buying blood directly from individual donors and sell-
ing it to hospitals. Turning donors away was not an encouraged practice.
49. ADLER, supra note 1, at 155.
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sides and decided that the defendant acted unreasonably
even if it merely followed common industry practice. As
members of the community affected by the defendant's prac-
tices, the jury performs a valuable task when it sometimes
delivers a message that what is commonly done is not neces-
sarily what ought to be done.5" This is particularly true in
the area of products liability where economic theory and em-
pirical studies demonstrate that accountability through liti-
gation increases product safety.51
Second, even if, as Adler claims, the damage award was
excessive, it was less due to the jury's shortcomings and more
to the lawyers and judge who failed to provide guidance for
the jury regarding the proper calculation of damages. Be-
sides, I wonder if Adler would be willing to be infected with
the AIDS virus in exchange for $8 million. Finally, there is
nothing in this case that supports Adler's belief that average
Americans are prejudiced against large corporations.52
This is another atypical case. Many persons injured by
defective products never file a lawsuit and plaintiffs win only
half of the very few cases that make it to trial. 3 What this
case does illustrate is the value of the civil jury trial. Adler
describes a thoughtful group of individuals who, despite for-
midable obstacles, took their duties very seriously. As is usu-
ally the case, these jurors reached what they collectively
thought was the correct verdict. Their mistake, of course,
was that Adler would have ruled otherwise. After all, what
50. In determining whether a defendant's conduct is unreasonable under
the circumstances, the jury is not required to accept a defendant's conduct as
reasonable simply because it did what most members of the defendant's indus-
try do. But, again, lets remember that jurors rule in favor of corporate defend-
ants in at least half the products liability cases.
51. See, e.g., Mark Geistfeld, Tort Reform May Be Unfunded Mandate,
NAT'L L.J., Sept. 18, 1995, at A21.
52. If it is true, however, Adler should utilize his journalistic skills to ex-
plore why average citizens are biased against big corporations. Every week cor-
porate America divests itself of thousands of employees as a result of "rightsiz-
ing,"" outsourcing," and mergers. The workers who stay behind are stressed
because they have to work harder to make up for their lost colleagues and anx-
ious that they may be the next ones to be let go. It would be valuable to deter-
mine whether these factors affect a corporation's credibility when it argues at
trial that corporate practices are guided not by economics, but by the consum-
ers' interests.
53. Citing to various studies, Adler acknowledges that plaintiffs only win
half the personal injury cases brought against corporate defendants. ADLER,
supra note 1, at 147.
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are twelve regular people when compared to one Harvard-ed-
ucated lawyer?
E. Jurors Can't See Through Mark Fuhrman
The last "incorrectly" decided case involves a white police
officer who kills a Hispanic man that the officer believes is
responsible for the breakup of his marriage. The trial's out-
come hinged on the credibility of the officer and his estranged
wife, the only witnesses to the shooting. The shooting oc-
curred in the home once shared by the officer and his wife.
The officer claimed that the shooting was the accidental re-
sult of a struggle with the victim, who outweighed the officer
by fifty pounds. The officer's wife testified that the officer had
found the victim in bed, then, as the victim attempted to get
dressed, used his service weapon to beat and then kill him.
Adler argues that the jury acquitted the officer because
they believed his version of the events. Adler describes the
officer as "clean-cut and pleasant-looking." Mark Fuhrman
comes to mind. The officer was a good witness who "looked
right at the jurors when he talked, as if he were speaking
with them in their living rooms."54 By contrast, the officer's
wife was a "plain dressed" and "not very good-looking" His-
panic woman whose "don't-mess-with-me" demeanor... sug-
gested an unpleasant toughness."5 She was not a good wit-
ness, appearing unemotional, hostile, and coached. 56
Adler's argument that the jury found the shooting to be
accidental primarily because the jurors were unable to prop-
erly judge the credibility of the witnesses is not entirely un-
persuasive. Even if this is true, however, the case does not
support Adler's inference that juries are incompetent.
A glance under the surface of the case reveals other fac-
tors which likely played a role in the jury's verdict. That this
jury found the white officer not guilty in the killing of a non-
white man is not enough to conclude that the jury's verdict
was due to the jurors inability to judge credibility. I suspect
that even after the Rodney King case, most juries who hear
police brutality cases will continue to acquit the accused of-
54. Id. at 193.
55. Id. at 185.
56. Id. at 186.
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ficers at a high rate.57 Maybe there is a deep-rooted belief
that the police only brutalize those who deserve it. Maybe
there is widespread ignorance about the prevalence of police
brutality against people of color. It will be interesting to ex-
plore whether the widely publicized Mark Fuhrman tapes
will affect how juries judge the credibility of police officers in
future police brutality cases.
Empirical studies demonstrate that, without training,
most of us are poor judges of credibility.58 After all, several
prosecutors and a judge were unable to properly assess Mark
Fuhrman's credibility. It is possible that another jury would
also have acquitted the officer in Adler's case. In the last ten
years, empirical research has shed much light on the process
by which we judge the credibility of trial witnesses.59 Adler
eloquently argues this recently acquired knowledge regard-
ing credibility should be incorporated into jury instructions. 60
F. They Are Bad, but...
Although Adler spends the bulk of the book berating jury
performance, the final section of the book begins with the
startling exultation that the jury trial must be preserved at
any cost. Adler suggests a formula for improving jury per-
formance, including changes in jury selection and better com-
munication between judges and jurors.
Adler contends that juries do not reflect the community
because the jury selection system is in disrepair. Too little is
done to enforce jury duty and too many able citizens are ex-
57. This opinion is based on numerous conversations with experts working
in the criminal justice system.
58. Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock After
Twelve Years, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIL JURY SYSTEM 181, 192-94 (Rob-
ert E. Litan ed., 1993); A. DANIEL YARMEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS
TESTIMONY (1979); Steven I. Friedland, On Common Sense and the Evaluation
of Witness Credibility, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 165 (1990). However, the Mark
Fuhrman fiasco demonstrates that even trained lawyers and judges are not par-
ticularly good at judging credibility.
59. Lempert, supra note 58, at 192-94.
60. ADLER, supra note 1, at 208-11. But see Steven A. Saltzburg, Improving
the Quality of Jury Decisionmaking, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY
SYSTEM 341, 356-57 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993) (arguing that jury instructions
on witness credibility should be simplified to inform the jury only that they
should determine who to believe, what to believe and the weight to be given to
any evidence).
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empted from jury duty.61 Adler advises that the current
trend is for states to eliminate or reduce exemptions to jury
duty. Although he is vague on specifics, Adler suggests that
jury duty should be made obligatory and jury service less
burdensome.
Adler urges that to achieve more representative juries,
courts should eliminate peremptory challenges and voir dire,
allowing the first randomly selected twelve persons to become
the jury. This suggestion is not likely to be taken seriously.
For one thing, forming a jury with the first twelve persons
who show up to court would not result in a representative
jury any more often than current systems of jury selection.
Adler admits that the jury system requires more than
"building a better jury" and proposes that "poor courtroom
practices" also be eliminated. Adler persuasively admonishes
that juries should be given instructions on the applicable
laws in plain English and before evidence is introduced at
trial. Adler endorses the trend to allow jurors to take notes
and, with some safeguards, ask witnesses questions during
the trial. He also encourages judges to take more control of
their courtrooms in order to shorten trials. Adler's section on
improving the system is very short on specifics. When com-
bined with his unrelenting attack on juries, Adler's last-min-
ute effort to convince the reader that he actually believes in
the jury system is unpersuasive.
V. CRITIQUE OF THE BOOK
Despite its many flaws, this book has undeniable appeal.
Its major strength is that Adler is a good journalist whose
writing is accessible to a broad audience. His reporting is
clear and concise. Adler's journalistic instinct for sensational
stories keeps The Jury's narrative clipping along. The ab-
sence of legalese, technical jargon, and statistics makes the
book appealing to a vast audience. Recent and current sensa-
tional trials are likely to keep The Jury selling crisply for
many months.
61. Adler reports that across the country, 55% of persons who receive jury
notices simply ignore them but suffer no consequences. Adler also describes
how New York automatically exempts from jury duty many professionals, law
enforcement officers, firefighters, sole business proprietors and even members
of certain religious groups. ADLER, supra note 1, at 219.
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The book's main flaw emerges in the first chapter. Adler
suggests that the cases he chose to examine are typical and
therefore their analysis can be extrapolated to all cases. By
Adler's own account, there are approximately 150,000 jury
trials a year.62 The six cases in this book, therefore, do not
constitute a random sample of jury verdicts and, as such, can-
not provide a true picture of how juries work.63 As Adler's
book reveals, using a few dramatic cases to make generaliza-
tions about the overall effectiveness of juries leads to biased
conclusions about how to improve jury performance.
This problem is not alleviated by Adler's "reconstruction"
of the trials by interviews with the players. Because Adler
was not present during the actual deliberations, there is re-
ally no way to know how juries reached their decisions. Revi-
sionist accounts by jurors justifying their decision are not al-
ways (if ever) reliable. This diminishes the value of Adler's
generalizations based on a few interviews.
Adler's opinion that most jurors are inept because he dis-
agreed with their result is arrogant. It is possible for com-
mon folks to reach a correct decision even if an Ivy League-
trained lawyer would decide the case differently. When cou-
pled with his claim that most jurors he observed were unedu-
cated simpletons, his conclusion is elitist and even more
offensive.
In the current climate of political pandering, Adler's
broad assessments based on anecdotes are exactly what
many politicians are using to validate legislation that will
harm the nation for many years to come. This makes Adler's
bald conclusions particularly troublesome.
Finally, after spending the bulk of the book trashing ju-
ries, Adler's late defense of the system sounds hollow and dis-
ingenuous. At the very least, it is schizophrenic. He focuses
mainly on poorly performing juries yet wants us to believe he
is actually defending the jury system. The first two
paragraphs of the last section of the book encapsulate this
62. ADLER, supra note 1, at 215.
63. See MacCoun, supra note 34, at 137-80. MacCoun, one of Adler's
sources, warns that accounts such as Adler's are distorted because the use of
only a few cases "in no way constitute a random sample ofjury verdicts and are
therefore unlikely to tell us anything about the more general distribution of
jury verdicts or the performance of jurors." Id. at 139.
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book's schizoid perspective. Adler first assails the jury sys-
tem and calls for its abolition.
[N]one of the juries in the previous section of this book did
much to justify our extraordinary reliance on the jury sys-
tem. Instead, they reinforced our doubts about the compe-
tence, fairness, and even much-vaunted common sense of
jurors .... Nearly every other nation has shunned the
jury; with some constitutional engine work, we could
too.
6 4
In the next breath, however, Adler argues that our jury
system is too valuable to scrap. "Even in the cases in which
the juries we observed performed woefully, it seemed clear
that there were powerful reasons to want a jury to make the
decision." The problem, however, is that it is not at all clear
that Adler's unrelenting attack is actually an argument in
favor of the jury.
Adler condemns juries for what he deems to be "bad deci-
sions" but his criticisms are usually unrelated to the jury's
actual performance. Although he appears to understand that
these "bad decisions" are often the result of underlying fac-
tors for which jurors cannot be held accountable, Adler
glosses over the reasons these problems exist and how they
can be resolved. Adler's contribution to the current debate
about the jury would be more persuasive if the book included
an in-depth examination of how the incompetence of judges
and lawyers affects jury decision-making. Moreover, a valua-
ble addition to the book would have been Adler's analysis of a
complex trial in which the jury was instructed early, the law-
yers and judge were competent and the jury reached a "cor-
rect" verdict. By demonstrating how better results are
achieved when most of the systems' shortcomings are sur-
mounted, this comparison would have provided more persua-
sive grounds for implementing Adler's suggested
improvements.
VI. CONCLUSION
The importance of the jury to our increasingly complex
society requires that we continually study and seek to im-
prove the jury process. The widespread controversy over re-
cent sensational trials underscores our fascination with ju-
64. ADLER, supra note 1, at 215.
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ries.65 In their aftermath, we can expect more assaults on
the jury system. Unfortunately, most of the reactions will
parallel Adler's attack on juries.
Part of the problem may be that Adler's standards for
jury behavior are difficult if not impossible to meet. His ideal
that "[a] justice system can't just look marvelous in theory; it
has to work day after day in case after case," reflects an admi-
rable but improbable aspiration. First, it is almost impossi-
ble for someone not present during deliberations to determine
how the decision was reached. Second, no institution that de-
pends on human endeavor will work as intended every time.
That may make the system less than completely predictable,
but it does not require its demise. Particularly when the al-
ternatives are more offensive to the democratic ideal.
65. The condemnation and praise for the outcome of the O.J. Simpson trial
focused our attention on whether the jury system functioned properly in the
latest "trial of the century." See, e.g., Joe Lambe & Tom Jackman, Case Throws
Shadows Over Legal System, KAN. CrrY STAR, Oct. 4, 1995, at A15; A. M. Rosen-
thal, Verdict on a Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1995, at A2; Matthew Schofield,
Polls on Justice Reflect Racial Split, KAN. CrrY STAR, Oct. 4, 1995, at Al.
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